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The hypothesis of financial constraints suggest that firms be denied profitable investment due 
to inaccessible to external capital markers as debt and equity financing are no longer perfect 
substitution after firms utilise internal capital. In view of reducing investments during global 
financial crisis in 2008-2009, the study investigates 157 firms whether they face the issues of 
financial constraint in Malaysia.  In general, non-family firms rely heavily on external debt 
market while family controlled firms utilising internal cash and reducing their dependence on 
debt market for their investments. However, the presence of CEO duality does not exaggerate 
the problem of financial constraints firms, but rather lead family firms to become stagnant in 
their investments.  Independent directors appear to be ineffective in governance family firms 
for issuing financing for investment. Apparently, their presence in family firms reduce firms’ 
investment opportunities either through internal cash flow and external debt financing, which 
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Finance literature such as pecking order theory suggests firms may follow the hierarchy of 
financing on the conjecture that there is a perfect substitution among the sources of financing. 
However, firms may not able to follow the hierarchy system because of the problem of 
information asymmetry. Moreover, debt and equity financing are not perfect substitution after 
firms utilize internal capital (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Based on this argument, Fazzari, et al. 
(1988)’s seminar work suggest the problem of financial constraints where firms have to 
foregone efficient investments when there are confined to limited internal cash flow and 
external capital are inaccessible.  The problems lead to the problem of inefficient investment 
especially in emerging economies where the degree of financial liberalizations and 
developments are lower as compared to developed countries (Laeven, 2003; Love, 2003).   
 
One main cause of information asymmetry is due to the issues of ownership control. Agency 
problems exist between managerial and external shareholders in Anglo Saxon economies or 
between large block holders and external minority shareholders in East Asian countries will 
lead to disadvantages of information to shareholders.  In East Asian countries where family 
controlled firms are prevalent, the issue of utilizing cash flows and their investment activities 
is always an interest empirical subject. Moreover, large shareholders who are normally 
controlling family firms are more inclined to expropriate shareholders’ value for their private 
benefits.   
 
A recent study across 40 countries by Lins, et al. (2013) prove that financially unconstrained 
firms controlled by family underperform vis-à-vis non-family during global financial crisis in 
2008-2009. This suggests mismanagement of free cash flow for inefficient investment if 
firms are not financial constrained.  Moreover, family controlled firms do not alleviate 
financial constraints during a financial shock as compared to non-family controlled firms. 
This further suggest that investment in non-family firms and return to shareholders are 
higher.  The findings aligned to the findings that large shareholders expropriate shareholders’ 





The above literature suggests that firms are predisposed to expropriate shareholders value 
when face with financial crisis. During the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, it is also 
observed that there is a decline in private investment in Malaysia on the back of poorer 
capital market performance where Bursa Malaysia saw a plunged to 864 index point in 
August 2008 from 1445 index point in 2007 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2010). On the same 
notes, loan disbursed was reducing by 10% during global financial period of 2008-2009. This 
raises an interesting question on whether firms enhancing shareholders’ value during the 
crisis. More importantly, is there any differences between family controlled firms and non-
family controlled firms in financing and investments’ decision towards benefits of 
shareholders value during financial crisis. Two fundamental reasons may explain the 
misappropriation of shareholders’ value. First, there are disparity of objectives between 
controlling large shareholders which are usually family controlled, and minority of 
shareholders, and secondly, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in 
monitoring family large shareholders in utilizing financing towards firms’ investments.  
 
Studies on poorer governance firms in emerging economy such as Malaysia are well 
documented in Singh’s (2003), Claessens et al’s . (2000) studies on poor performance in 
1990s, prior to 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Some literature also suggested that poor 
corporate governance were the causes of over investments prior to East Asian financial crisis 
( Claessens et al.,  2003). The study in Lins, et al. (2013), although control for the specific 
issues of financial constraints, did not provide further explanations on the reasons why family 
firms underperform during global financial crisis. Moreover, the data provided in particularly 
for Malaysian firms are dubious1. 
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was first introduced in 2000, and improved in 
2007 and 2012, respectively. The code focuses on strengthening the roles and fiduciaries duty 
of board member. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of board on firms decision making are 
seldom examine empirically, especially from the perspective of ownership form perspective. 
A priori, it is uncertain on the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ cash 
flow, or external capital towards their decision in investments in this economy.  
 
                                                          
1 Lins et al (2013), based on Osiris database reported 70% of Malaysian firms are widely held, 8% are family 
controlled, 6% are non-family controlled and 16% are multiple block holders.  The data may not hold true as 
Malaysian firms are mainly large block holders controlled by family. See example Claessens, et al.(1998); 
Claessens et al. (2000). The type of controlling structure have not changed much even in 2015.   
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Some literature in western economies describe corporate governance in family controlled 
firms as being weak (eg  Berrone et al., 2012). On the other hand, literature suggests that 
excess cash flow is closely linked to weak governance structure and consequently increases 
in capital expenditures and acquisitions (Harford, et al., 2008). Based on this literature, 
hence, this rise questions whether family controlled firms facing financial constraints in 
Malaysia or not? Are family controlled firms become more effective under corporate 
governance mechanisms in Malaysia? Undeniably, family controlled firms which dominate 
the economy possess strength in corporate entrepreneurship which may also lead to long term 
sustainability ( Whyte, 1996 ). Moreover, family controlled firms in East Asian economies 
are known for contributing greatly to national Gross National Product through their 
international business expansion and establishment of conglomerates which create value. In 
order to protect their family business, firms are independent and relying on internal capital 
rather than raising funds from external market which subject them to external governance and 
may also reduce their controlling interest in firms. In that perspective, relying on internal 
capital could lead to entrepreneurship characteristics of risk taking and faster decision making 
which subsequently enhancing large family controlling block interest, which minority 
shareholders may also share the benefits.   
 
In Malaysia, where local established firms are largely family owned. Therefore, a study on 
whether family firms invest effectively or not is essential to the understanding of capital 
market development. Using 157 firms from 2008 to 2010, this study adds to our knowledge 
of the issues of financial constraints  Malaysian firms are facing, under the perspective of 
corporate governance mechanisms. The findings highlight the effectiveness of the corporate 




Prior to East Asian financial crisis, leverage in East Asian economies, measured by private 
debt over GDP were on average more than 100%. Finance literature on East Asian financial 
crisis documented that firms increase their leverage (Faccio, et al., 2003) so as to accelerate 
investments (Claessens, et. al., 2003) and facilitate entrenchment or expropriation on 
shareholders. After the crisis, various corporate governance mechanism are introduced to 
ensure firms’ dedication towards good governance which enhancing board effectiveness 
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through its compositions, such as number of independent board members,  and reducing 
duality of leadership. Nonetheless, the interaction behavior between family ownership and 
corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ capital (internal cash and external capital) and 
subsequently towards investments in emerging economy, such as Malaysia is a priori, 
unknown. This is due to family owners may emphasis their private family business rather 
than serving a wide shareholders’ benefits.  
 
Generally family firms are always argued as less efficient in investment as information 
asymmetries is greater.  It is deemed that firms are reluctant to raise capital from external 
equity market, where the cost of capital is higher and eventually reduce shareholders’ value 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). The objective of family firms therefore lead to the issues of 
financial constraints. Hence, adverse selection problem prevails and firms forgo investments 
and lead to the problem of under-investment. In this perspective, firms in developing 
countries which have a higher external cost of capital should pursue internal capital financing 
which is lower in cost of capital.  
 
However, the empirical findings on this perspective are not widely accepted. A 32% of 
investments in 10 developing countries are found to utilize external capital despite a higher 
cost of capital (Glen and Singh, 2004). A recent study by Ameer (2011) further shows that 
firms with concentrated ownership in developing countries and emerging countries from a 
sample of 14 Asian countries are not financially constrained. On the other end, the ease of 
financing may have encouraged them to borrow more from debt market rather than equity 
market to avoid the dilution of ownership and control.  Similar findings are also found in 
developed economies such as USA and UK. Kathuria and Mueller (1995) raise the question 
on why the private investment in these countries dependent more on internal financing rather 
than external financing which is more developed. Another study by Aggrawal and Zong’s 
(2006) on similar issues report that the US, UK, Japan and Germany have relied on internal 
financing despite their advanced development in debt and equity market. Moreover, financial 
unconstrained firms have a lower sensitivity towards investment in the US and UK than in 
Japan and Germany. This could be explained as widely dispersed ownership structure incurs 
higher monitoring and agency costs to shareholders as compared to their counterpart in Japan 





Recent studies on individual countries on forms of ownership suggest different perspective of 
firms’ financing on investment.  Andres’ (2011) findings in Germany further suggest that 
investment in family firms are not constraints towards external capital market. Family firms 
are also found to invest effectively irrespective of cash flow availability. This finding is in 
contrast to the argument that families are reluctant to raise capital from external capital 
market. In another study in Italy, on the other hand, suggest that independent firms face more 
financial constraints vis-à-vis national groups and subsidiaries of multinational corporations 
(Shiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000).  Lins (2013) concludes that family firms underperform 
and reduce their capital investments during the global financial crisis (2008-2009). 
Nonetheless, family constrained firms do not underperform as compared to family 
unconstrained firms which reduce firms’ value.   
 
Apparently, the empirical findings do not augur well with the argument of information 
asymmetry and agency costs. Singh (2003) further suggests that specifications in emerging 
markets could provide evidence that firms to employ mostly internal finance rather than 
external debt and equity financing. Based on this statement and the fundamental issues in 
financial constraints, and family firms have a longer investment horizons than non-family 
firms in investments which may enhance their controlling interest. Moreover, the proposition 
in Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that the problem of information asymmetry lead to the 
issues of imperfect capital substitution. Information asymmetry is prevalent in emerging 
economies such as Malaysia, firms face financial constraints will illustrate a positive 
sensitivity between cash flows and investment, which they may  forgo investment due to 
insufficient external financing, as external financing may not be their preferences. Hence, we 
propose that:- 
 
H1: There is an issue of financial constraints in family controlled firms.  
 
Whether the introduction of corporate governance create an impact on firms’ board 
leadership and quality of decision making is a subject of interest. San Martin and Duran 
(2012) conclude that corporate governance structure in family firms diverge significantly 
from non-family firms. In a study related to cash holdings, Dittmar et al. (2003) conclude that 
countries with weak shareholders right, cash holding in firms are twice than firms in strong 
shareholders right. In another study, Dittmar and Mahrt  (2007) find that corporate 
governance could double the value of a dollar as compared to a weak corporate governance 
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system. Firms with poor corporate governance also dissipate cash quickly and reduce firms’ 
operating performance. 
 
Siebels and Zu (2012) highlight governance mechanisms of CEO’s duality and board 
independence as two board characteristics that could lead to the problem of expropriation 
shareholders by large shareholders in family business. Based on this framework for family 
business, Goh et al. (2014) conclude from the study on Malaysia that CEO duality are more 
towards facilitating relational transactions in a relationship based economy, rather than have 
an effective role for corporate governance purpose. This indicates that CEO duality will 
further weakens the roles of governance mechanisms in family business.  Moreover, 
independent directors in family business, on the other hand, make no impacts on firms’ value, 
and could not function effectively as a corporate governance mechanism.  
 
The presence of CEO duality is likely to compromise the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanism in family firms. However, the introduction of corporate governance 
mechanism which discourage duality may distort the founder’s entrepreneurship which could 
not be separated away from protecting family wealth and interest. In view that weak 
governance structure is associated with higher cash holding (Dittmar et al., 2003), this will 
opportunity for  expropriation of firms’ value. On the same notes, a weak corporate 
governance structure such as CEO duality board structure will encourage high cash holding 
structure for their investment, a scenario of financial constraints, which eventually lead to 
inefficient investments.  
 
Incorporation of independent directors as board member is always viewed as inefficient 
monitoring mechanism, especially in family business. Literature suggest that the appointment 
may be influenced by possible personal ties or contractual relationship with the controlling 
family. Moreover, family firms view independent directors as a source of expertise rather 
than monitoring. Hence, independent directors would likely lend support to board who 
appointed them, which render the effectiveness of internal governance (Goh, et.al., 2014).  
Based on this conjecture, independent director which is relationship based (weak corporate 
governance) will lead to inefficient invest by incurring internal cash flow for investment in 




In view that we posit that family ownership is financial constraints in the first hypothesis, the 
second hypothesis will suggest that weak governance mechanism(CEO Duality and 
Independent Directors) enhance the issues of financial constraints  (a positive relationship 
between cash flows and investment) in family controlled firms.  
 
H2: In the scenario of weak corporate governance mechanism- CEO duality will lead to 
financial constraints in family firms.  
 
H3: In the scenario of weak corporate governance mechanism- Independent director will lead 




The first model is to examine whether firms face the problem of financial constraints. We 
follow the model proposed by Goergan and Renneboog (2001), which follows the variant of 
the Bond and Meghir’s (1994) first-order conditions of a maximization process. The equation 
1 shows the model. Apparently, the future investment is dependent on the current’s 
investments, and would only be unaffected by financial constraints. It would follow a positive 
coefficient sign higher than one for the lagged investments towards current investments, and 
the negative coefficient lesser than one for the squared lagged investments variable (Bond 
and Meghir, 1994). A negative coefficient is expected for cash flow towards future 
investments2 if market is perfect and there is no problem of financial constraints. This is due 
to a higher level of current cash flow implies lower net marginal adjustment costs of 
investing presently(t), which would lead to a lower expected investment next period(t+1) to 
achieve an equilibrium3. However, in an imperfect capital market, due to the effects of 
financial constraints, future investment may be positively related to cash flow. Our based line 
































































                                                                                                                                 --eq.1 
                                                          
2 A negative coefficient cash flow on investment implying a higher level of current cash flow but a lower net 
marginal adjustment costs today. Therefore, it would lead to a lower expected investment tomorrow (Harrison 
and McMillan, 2003).  
3 If the marginal benefits from the installation of an additional unit of capital at time t exceeded the marginal 
costs for investment at time t+1, the firm would invest more in time t and vice versa. 
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Where I  stands for the investment levels, S  for the total sales, K for the capital stock, D for 
total debt and CF  for cash flow, CEO Duality is a dummy of 1 equals duality, 0 otherwise, 
Ind represent independent director.  Dummies for year 2008 and 2009 are also included.  
 
To examine hypothesis 1, the equation 1 is extended to incorporate interact term of dummy 
for family in equation 2.  If the largest shareholder is related to family owned (Fam), it is 
dubbed as 1, other non-family firms will be 0. From the interaction term, we will know 
whether family firms incur higher cash flow (positive sign) for investment, and a lower 
debt/equity (negative) for investment financing. Based on these relationship, we could 































































































To examine hypothesis 2, we use an interation terms (CG) to represent  governance 
mechanism that may influence independent variables towards investment decision making in 
equation 3. These two variables are CEO Duality and Board Independent (Ind).  A positive 
















































































































































                                                   -------eq. 3 
Lastly, we examine whether the problem of corporate governance mechanisms on cash flows 
prevail on family firms or not. The equation 4 is extended to include Fam with the interaction 
of CF x CG, i.e,  CF x CG x Fam. .This interaction term serve as robust test whether the result of 
financial constraints is valid in family control firms. In all the models,  sales  
K
S  serve as 
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Capital expenditure on fixed assets which represents the funds used 
to acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisitions.  
Total sales are applied to normalize investment of the firms. 
Cash flow  
S
CF  Cash flow normalized by  sales 
DEBT  
K
D  Total Debt divided by equity 
Sales  
K
S   Total Sales normalized  by equity  
CG- Duality  Corporate governance mechanism for CEO or managing director 
who has two roles- as CEO or managing director and chairman in a 
company.  
CG- IND Corporate governance mechanism for fraction of independent 
directors over total directors in a company,  
Fam Dummy for family controlled firms. Dummy equals 1, otherwise 
equals 0 
Y08,Y09 Year dummy for 2008 and 2009 
 
 
Firms listed on Bursa Malaysia at Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) subsector 2000 
level are used as our sample.  The fundamental criteria is to assess the availability of data 
based on annual reports from 2008 to 2010 to whether a firm is controlled by a family or not. 
The family status is determined through the largest shareholder is an individual name or a 
Sdn Bhd family name. A total of 157 sample firms is the finalized figures from initial list of 
279 firms. The sample firms are building materials (31 firms), heavy construction (24 firms), 
containers and packaging (15 firms), diversified industries (16 firms), electrical components 
and equipment (9 firms), electronic equipment (6 firms), commercial vehicles and truck (5 
firms), industrial machinery (29 firms), transportation services (7 firms), trucking (4 firms) 
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Figure 1 illustrates the trend of the sample firms from 2007 to 2010. The investment figures in fact 
increased from 2007 to 2009, despite global financial crisis in 2008-2009, before dipping in 2010. 
Interestingly, the cash flow in family firms was relatively higher than non-family firms in 2007 and 
2008. In 2009, cash flow in non-family controlled firms has become higher on the back of increasing 
investment in the country. In 2010, while investment was reducing marginally, the sample firms 
showed that cash flow was in fact increased during the year.  However, the trend does not illustrate 
the relationship between cash flows and investment.  
 




Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample in our study. On average, the investment level in 
our sample was 8.13 times from the sales for the period year 2008 and 2009, and reaching 8.24 times 
in 2009 and 2010.  The cash flow over sales, in fact increased steadily to 8.93 times in 2009-2010 as 
compared to 2008. The sample firms also show a debt ratio of 0.7 to equity. There are 99 firms which 
are family owned, while 69 firms are non-family related. Out of the 168 sample, there are 70 firms 
whose CEO or managing directors are holding duality post while 98 firms’ CEO are not. Fraction of 





























2007 2008 2009 2010
Fam Non-Family All IS
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median  Maximum Minimum  Std. Dev. 
 
S
I   2008-2009 0.0813 0.0300 3.7682 0 0.2383 
 
S
I   2009-2010 0.0824 0.0283 3.7682 0.0001 0.2601 
 
S
CF  2008-2009 8.7377 7.73 80.62 -99.26 16.4021 
 
S
CF  2009-2010 8.9341 7.84 137.46 -139.02 18.167 
 
K
D  2008-2009 0.7132 0.3523 6.9762 0 1.0014 
 
K
D  2009-2010 0.6992 0.3253 6.9762 0 0.9628 
 
K
D  2008-2010 0.7085 0.3498 6.9762 0 0.9884 
 
K
S   2008- 2010 0.6992 0.3253 6.9762 0 0.9628 
IND  0.4635 0.4300 1 0.14 0.1547 
Duality  Duality = 70        Non-Duality =98 
Fam       Family Controlled=99  Non-Family= 68 




I   
S
CF   
K
S   
K
D  




1             




0.1073 1.0000           




0.0507 -0.0233 1.0000         




-0.0421 0.0612 0.2694 1.0000       
  (-0.5300) (0.7707) (3.5169)*** -----        
Duality -0.0089 0.0512 0.0589 0.0542 1.0000     
  (-0.1114) (0.6442) (0.7420) (0.6823) -----      
IND  -0.1082 0.0828 0.0215 0.0633 0.1840 1.0000   
  (-1.3677) (1.0443) (0.2699) (0.7967) (2.3533)** -----    
FAM  0.0559 -0.0610 -0.1335 -0.0416 -0.0103 -0.1810 1 
  (0.7033) (-0.7680) (-1.6937)* (-0.5235) (-0.1295) (-2.3138)** -----  













Table 4 Financial Constraints in Family Firms 

































































































































CF  i,t-11 x FAM 










D  i,t-1 x FAM 









   
-0.0105 
   
-0.0110 





   
-0.0172 
   
-0.0186 




         R-squared 0.5163   0.4899   0.7242   0.4761 




























Observations 471   471   471   471 
* Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. t-statistics are in parentheses 
 
Table 3 gives the Pearson correlation matrixes of the variables in our sample. None of the 
variables shows significantly high correlations among each other’s. The initial findings on 
relationship show that cash flows is positive, while debt shows a negative relationships to 
14 
 
investment, implying a scenario of financial constraints in Malaysia.  There is a positive 
correlation between family controlled firms and investments. Corporate governance 
mechanism- duality and independent directors negatively explain investment, but their 
relationship with cash flows are positive which highlights a possible weak governance in 
firms. Nonetheless, the correlation between family and corporate governance mechanisms are 
negative. 
 
The first two models in table 4 using the base line equation 1 to examine the issues of 
financial constraints in Malaysia. In these two models, we do not control for family firms. 
This is to examine whether the model comply with the financial constraints absent scenarios 
or not. The results show a positive coefficient sign for (IS)i,t-1, for the lagged investments 
towards current investments, and a negative coefficient sign, for which is less than one for 
squared lagged independent variable(IS)2i,t-1. These relationships comply with the theoretical 
predictions of first-order conditions of a maximization process as suggested by Bond and 
Meghir (1994) for financial constraints absent scenarios. However, the base model does not 
indicate a significant negative sign4, but instead an insignificant positive sign implying that 
firms in Malaysia do not adjust for a lower investment in the next t+1 period as their 
marginal cost today is higher. Similarly, there is no significant of using debt for firms’ 
investment. Hence, firms in Malaysia will not achieve equilibrium as suggested in Harrison 
and McMillan (2003), and will lead to inefficient investment due to their marginal cost is 
higher at t.  The year dummies which show negative relationship confirms the trend in the 
sample firms’ investment in 2008 and 2009, comparing to the 2010. 
 
In model 3 and 4, we apply equation 2 to examine the interaction term of internal cash flow 
and external debt with family controlled firms, which we hypothesize that family firms will 
face financial constraints. In model 3, the findings show that each percent in cash flow in 
family [  
S
CF  i,t-11 x FAM ] will increase investments for an additional 3.7%, as compared to 
non- family firms [  
S
CF  i,t-1 , when Fam equals 0] which is negative and insignificant. The 
negative significance for interaction term of [  
K
D  i,t-1 x FAM]  of -0.0082  further confirms 
family firms reduce their external debt financing will result in reducing their investment by 
0.82%, which confirm the presence of financial constraints in family controlled firms. On the 
                                                          
4 A negative coefficient cash flow on investment implying a higher level of current cash flow but a lower net 
marginal adjustment costs today. Therefore, it would lead to a lower expected investment tomorrow (Harrison 
and McMillan, 2003).  
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other hand, non- family firms [  
K
D   i,t-1 , when Fam equals 0], continues to rely on external 
debt for investment at a significant positive contribution to investment for 0.82%, while there 
is no significant findings for cash flow.  The findings remain consistent in model 4, when the 
dummy for year 2008 and 2009 are included.   
 
In summary, we find the support that family firms face financial constraints as compared to 
non-family firms which rely largely on debt financing. Hence, hypothesis 1, there is an issue 
of financial constraints in family controlled firms is supported.   
 
Table 5 Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance (Duality) in Family Firms 
    Model 1     Model 2      
c 
 
0.023 (6.1021)*** 0.0230 (5.9863)*** 
(IS)i,t-1 
 
0.5944 (13.8338)*** 0.6220 (14.8519)*** 
(IS)2i,t-1 
 
-0.4777 (-4.5293)*** -0.5456 (-6.2710)*** 
 
K










D   i,t-1 0.0104 (2.7653)*** 0.0016 (0.6946)   
DUALITY 
 
-0.0068 (-1.9268)* -0.0117 (-1.9689)** 
IND   -0.009 (-1.2659)   -0.0007 (-0.1002)   
 
S





D   i,t-1 x FAM -0.0103 (-2.7529)*** -0.0016 (-0.6880) 
 DUALITY x FAM 0.0114 (2.3955)** 0.0178 (2.5595)** 
DUALITY x  
S
CF  i,t-1 0.0856 (2.8763)*** 0.0578 (1.7260)* 
 DUALITY X  
S
CF  i,t-1  x FAM -0.0408 (-1.0782)   -0.0087 (-0.2159)   
DUALITY x  
K
D   i,t-1 
   
0.0088 (0.8764) 
 DUALITY x  
K
D   i,t-1  xFAM     -0.0162 (-1.5622)   
D08 
 
-0.0108 (-4.0437)*** -0.0113 (-4.1450)*** 




  Adj. R-squared 0.4455 
  
0.4469 
  S.E. of regression 0.1312 
  
0.1293 
  F-statistic 27.9672 
  
24.8332 
  Durbin-Watson  1.8781 
  
1.9463 
  Observations 471    471    




To test whether corporate governance mechanisms are affective in monitoring family firms in 
incurring cash towards investment, we apply equation 4, corporate governance mechanisms 
to interact with cash flows, debt, and family, respectively in model 1 and 2, Table 5.   
 
The presence of CEO’s duality in family firms do not cause family firms to face financial 
constraints (model 1, table 5). This is in contrast to our hypothesis which predict that the 
presence of CEO’s duality will weaken the governance and therefore firms facing financial 
constraints. As duality variable is included,  DUALITY x  
S
CF i,t-1 x FAM  shows a non-
significant of -0.04, showing that the role of CEO in employing cash flow for investment has 
become  inessential in family firms.  However, the presence of duality also lead to 
insignificant level of external debt financing. This is shown on the interaction term DUALITY 
x  
K
D i ,t-1 x FAM  has caused the coefficient to become insignificant in family firms.  In 
summary CEO’s duality will make firms become more conservative in their investments, and 
we therefore could not find support for hypothesis 2, that CEO duality is a weak governance 
mechanism and will lead to the issues of financial constraints. 
 
In contrast, independent directors appear to be ineffective corporate governance mechanism 
as cash flow positively explain investments in family firms. Independent directors appear to 
be weak corporate governance as their presence in family firms [IND x  
S
CF i,t-1 x FAM] 
increases a percent of cash flow towards 18% in investment  vis-à-vis non family firms of 11% 
in model 1 ( table 6).  
 
The finding is consistent as we extend the variables to include external debt financing in 
model 2, table 6. The presence of independent directors in family firms [IND x  
K
D i ,t-1 x 
FAM], will result in any one per cent reduction in external debt financing and subsequently 
reduce the investment by 3.4%, while the magnitude of cash flow towards investment in 
family firms [IND x  
S
CF i,t-1 x FAM] is now at 13.2% as compared to 18% in model 1. In 
non-family firms, with the presence of independent director, [IND x  
K
D i ,t-1,  when Fam=0 ], 
it is found that increment of 1% in external financing will lead to the investment of 6.4%.  
 
The findings clearly confirm that the presence of independent directors in family firms lead to 
financial constraints as they rely on internal financing rather than external financing. The  
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Table 6 Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance (Independent Director ) in 
Family Firms 
     Model 1   Model 2  
c 
 
 0.0341 (11.2536)*** 0.042537 (7.6411)*** 
  
 
     (IS)i,t-1 
 
 0.5787 (14.3517)*** 0.636868 (14.6015)*** 
  
 
     (IS)2i,t-1 
 
 -0.4186 (-4.0134)*** -0.53439 (-4.5427)*** 
  
 
      
K





      
S
CF  i,t-1  -0.0713 (-2.1973)** -0.00977 (-0.4439) 
  
 
      
K





 0.0053 (2.2043)** 0.004721 (1.8710)* 
  
 
     IND 
 
 -0.0221 (-2.9727)*** -0.04667 (-3.7394)*** 
  
 
      
S
CF  i,t-1 x FAM  -0.0222 (-0.6530)* -0.03952 (-1.4227) 
  
 
      
K
D   i,t-1 x FAM  -0.0062 (-1.4219)* 0.008865 (0.9151) 
  
 
     IND x FAM  -0.0153 (-2.4550)** -0.00513 (-0.6807) 
  
 
     IND x  
S





     IND x  
S
CF  i,t-1 x FAM  0.1863 (2.7494)*** 0.132042 (2.0624)** 
  
 
     IND x  
K
D   i,t-1  




     IND x  
K
D   i,t-1 x  FAM  




 -0.0092 (-4.0982)*** -0.01049 (-3.9165)*** 
  
 
     D09 
 
 -0.0220 (-9.6053)*** -0.01882 (-7.3796)*** 
R-squared  0.5299 
  
0.487823 
 Adj. R-squared  0.5154 
  
0.469852 
 S.E. of regression  0.1330 
  
0.129333 
 F-statistic  36.7104 
  
27.14484 
 Durbin-Watson   1.8681 
  
1.899796 
 Observations  471   471   
* Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level. t-statistics are in parentheses 
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reduction in investment when using debt and cash flows financing clearly confirm the 
presence of financial constraints.  This confirms hypothesis 3, that   H3: In the scenario of 
weak corporate governance mechanism- Independent directors will lead to financial 




This study explains whether there is an issue of financial constraints in Malaysia family 
firms. Apparently, family firms prefer to utilize internal cash flow rather than external debt 
equity market for their investments. In contrast, non-family firms rely heavily on debt 
financing for investments.  The presence of CEO’s duality in family firms is rather 
ambiguous towards investments. Family firms with CEO’s duality do not increase their 
investments either through internal financing or external capital market.  Lastly, independent 
directors appear to be weak governance mechanism as it encourages internal financing but 
reducing firms to relying on external market. Their presence in family controlled firms 
significantly reduce firms financing especially through debt equity method.  Independent 
directors’ role in non-family firms appear to use external financing for investment purposes.  
 
From the study, family firms face financial constraints as they reduce their dependence on 
external financing to protect their private interest. Although family’s CEO duality is arguably 
presence to protect their controlling interest, we do not find them to further exaggerate the 
issues of financial constraints in family firms. However, the investment growth in family 
firms with CEO’s duality will be rather stagnant as shown by insignificant relationship of 
financing methods and investments. Clearly, firms with CEO’s duality are rather conservative 
towards investment. There may be other better reasons such as CEO’s controlling interest, or 
their compensation benefits which may affect this finding. Lastly, the findings on 
independent directors indicates that its role as corporate governance mechanism is rather 
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